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Atwo-tier conclusion is very much in harmony with the readings provided by this book: first, the major wars have ended but the process of peace is still ongoing and, second, ‘old’ Sudan is dead but a ‘new’ Sudan has not yet been born. Both echo the ‘Gramscian’ sense of crisis where the old is dead and the new has yet to emerge. Conceptually, this book departs completely from the conventional approach to reconstruction. It stresses both the ‘irretrievability’ of the pre-war situation and the ‘irr
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  Atwo-tier conclusion is very much in harmony with the readings provided by thisbook: first, the major wars have ended but the process of peace is still ongoing and, second, ‘old’ Sudan is dead but a ‘new’ Sudan has not yet been born. Both echo the ‘Gramscian’ sense of crisis where the old is dead and the new has yet to emerge.Conceptually, this book departs completely from the conventional approach to reconstruction. It stresses both the ‘irretrievability’ of the pre -war situation and the ‘irreversibilities’ characterizing changes brought about by war. The theoretical framework  also departs from the prevailing and influential ‘blueprints’ for reconstruction, mostprominently represented by the influential World Bank  report ‘Breaking the Conflict Tra p: Civil and Development Policy’ of 2003 and previous and other works by Collier (1999, 2003)who was the major author of  such ‘blueprints’ adopted by the World Bank. The report assesses causes and consequences of civil wars and suggests policies to reduce the likelihoodthat war will break out again. Different policy packages are suggested to match differentcauses of war. What is dominant however in these packages is the emphasis on retrieving pre- war institutions, particularly in the state. The Sudan ‘blueprints’ ignore almost completelythat the dynamics unleashed by civil war undermines such a possibility of a ‘happy’ retrieval.  Wars produce new demographic dynamics that transcend the limited notion of counting heads across spatial divides. These new dynamics, I argue, are central tounderstanding and recognizing that war itself is the ultimate expression of failed modernityprojects. In addition, the processes at work in the economy and society leading to war areshaped and reshaped by war itself. These become new forms of social and economic practicesthat shape the post-war environment. In other words, war produces essentially new political,social and economic spaces. Such alternative readings of the new dynamics unleashed by waritself, as has been explained in Chapters 6 and 7, further shaped and reshaped by theprocesses leading to the end of war and peace building, brings about significant implications to ‘post - development’ thinking. Such significant implications may include: low priorityassigned to urban questions in conventional developmental thinking, the need to understandthe informal economy beyond the notion of re-organization/formalization and how to top thepotential of such informality, the primacy of human capital and how to address problems of its war-led deficit including new mechanisms for enhancing the reproduction of humanresources and cultivating the potential of the existing translocal and transnational networks.  The primacy of a state is undoubtedly an important issue, but the question is, ‘Whatstate?’The emergence of a non -Weberian state is most prominently reflected in the diversityof centres of monopoly over violence and the multiplicity of actors in the provision of publicgoods (international NGOs, national NGOs including faith-based ones, community initiativesand the private sector). The study of the crisis in the Sudan that led to the erosion of thefeeble basis of the nation state is of direct relevance to current discourses on state failure andcollapse. State collapse plays a central role in studies dealing with conflict marginalizationand reconstruction in Africa (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Migdal, 1988; Milliken and Krause, 2002). The ‘weak state’ thesis may provide a useful insight and an enabling tool intounderstanding the working of the emerging complex economic structures and networks intowhich the centralized immediate post-colonial state has degenerated. However, the thesisneeds a further breaking down to capture the complex diversities involved in the sub-SaharanAfrican scenery pertaining to the structural foundations of various economies and differenthistorical paths as well as modes of configuration of political socio-economic formations.The temptation to generalize is strong. Many students of African politics cannot resist such atemptation, yet some others keep reminding the reader of an increasingly shrinking Africancategory. For example, Chabal and Daloz (ibid., p. xxi) exclude North Africa and the Horn of and Southern Africa because they have ‘dissimilar social structures and have had a different political experience’.   Most importantly, the ‘weak state’ thesis does not situate such weakness in the  broader structural foundations of the African state. Before proceeding any further let us recallthat the structural foundation of the immediate post-colonial state in most sub-Saharancountries was characterized by:-   relatively stable subsistence with stable institutions, limited and manageableflows and almost clear boundaries between the small niche of urban space andthe vast ocean of rural space, mostly dominated by small-scale agriculture;-   extraction and siphoning of the surplus that was equally manageable with thehigh-level visibility of trade and other flows and stable, relatively efficient formsof taxing largely pre-capitalist formations;-   a gradual, manageable and controllable pace of urbanization with a relativelylow level of informality that was fictional to and supportive for the emergingformal sector.  There were institutionalized low levels of linkages between rural  –  urban and local  –  international spheres with clear boundaries and the state being able to manage and controlflows of people, commodities, ideas, patterns of consumption and organized/localizedpatterns of intervention by external actors even when such intervention assumed an extremeform (orchestrated coups or assassination of leaders and rarely direct military intervention).Thus the boundaries between the local and the external were visible and functioning.On top of such well-bounded spheres, the state played a central role in resourceallocation and capital accumulation management, albeit with varying degrees of relativeautonomy.With the collapse of the modernization drive, the maintenance of such boundedlinkages, exchanges and flows became increasingly unattainable. Hence, the destruction of the basis of subsistence, failure to transform the rural communities and rural  –  urban exodusbecame inevitable. The ultimate collapse of the modernity project marked by prolonged civilstrife brought the process of state collapse to its conclusion, producing many ungovernableflows and blurring the boundaries between the local, the national and the international. Thecollapsing state was neither able to maintain boundaries nor manage flows of people andtransactions and oversee the once visible internal  –  external linkages. In the extreme casessuch as Maputo’s Congo, the state was hardly controlling anything beyond the capital.  In the case of Somalia, the state degenerated into a multiple autonomous domain of warlord control and translocal and transnational networks that were made viable because of the minimal role of central government in a largely pastoral economy. It is the unsustainablynascent immediate post-colonial state particularly in Africa that led many analysts to questionthe existence of such a state and terming it a quasi or pseudo-statehood. As Milliken and Krause (2002, p. 763) noted, this‘pseudo - statehood’ was in some cases converted into ‘real’ statehood, especially in Asia. But in many instances, especially in Africa, post-colonial statebuilding resulted in the formation of what Robert Jackson (1990) has called the ‘quasistate’.  The relevance of the state collapse thesis needs to be situated in this broader contextof failing structural support of the nascent statehood. Despite the obvious commonalitiesrepresented in the process of erosion of the weak structural foundation of the immediate post-colonial state, there are multiple forms of state break-up corresponding to different initialconditions and the multiplicity of forms of wealth production and surplus extraction. Such  multiplicity is well reflected in the alleged homogeneous residual of Africa à la Chabal andDaloz (ibid.).This book has provided an interpretation of the processes that led to crisis in post-colonial Sudan. It has traced the history of crisis making in Sudan with the main focus on twoimportant periods. The 1969  –  1983 period witnessed the intensification of the struggle overthe future direction of development and simultaneously laid the structural foundation of thecrisis. The NIF coup of post- 1989 brought such a crisis to its ultimate conclusion of complete erosion of the foundation of the post-colonial state. A lasting peace and transition toa truly democratic system will depend very much on a more comprehensive inclusive processat the national level but also in the South, Northeast and in particular in Darfur.There are, however, serious threats to the attainment of such inclusiveness. First, if in the present power sharing between the various contending forces, the armed groups and theNIF, both with narrow bases of representation, claim by virtue of their control over violence apolitical monopoly. Once armed contestation is over, far more representative actors who werehitherto dormant or less visible will naturally become more active actors (political parties andcivil society). Repressing them in the old manner is not an available option. Second, both theCPA and DPA have emphasized a transition to democracy and set dates for parliamentaryelections  –  whether such elections will translate into democracy is an open question. One of the challenges facing the process of democratization, and hence the task of making peace aninclusive process, is the erosion of the structural foundation built of a once vibrant politicaland civil society movement, particularly in Northern Sudan. The loss of such vibrancy wasinstrumental in the ascendancy of the NIF, as was thoroughly discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.The less vibrant political and social movement in South Sudan was equally weakened. AsAkec (2007) rightly observed:Southern Sudanese-based parties that were founded in the 1960s such as SouthernFront (SF) and SudanAfrican Nationalist Union (SANU) have either shrunk to insignificantsize or have completely disappeared from the political scene. The only legacy left behind isold comradeship or labels passed down family lines which can be used by some to favour ordiscriminate against one politician or a nother: ‘this is a Front diehard, you know’, is not an uncommon whisper…Least mentioned in many analyses, however, are the political risks  posed by increasingly fragmented party system and culture in South Sudan, in addition to theall too apparent political immaturity. By fragmented political system and culture I mean the
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